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Hodgkinson: Evaluating Candidacy Restrictions

EVALUATING CANDIDACY RESTRICTIONS: THE
IMPLICATIONS OF NEW YORK’S MODIFIED APPROACH
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
Walsh v. Katz1
(decided June 2, 2011)
I.

INTRODUCTION

Appellant Daniel Ross appealed from a decision of the Appellate Division, Second Department which upheld the constitutionality
of a residency requirement mandating that the fifth member of the
Southold town board, an elected position, reside on Fishers Island.2
In reaffirming the constitutionality of the statutory provision, the
New York Court of Appeals held that the impact of the residency requirement on the Southold residents’ voting rights was incidental and
minimal, and as such a rational basis standard of review, rather than a
strict scrutiny standard, was appropriate.3 Applying this standard, the
court further held that the residency requirement was rationally related to a legitimate state interest4 and thus did not offend the Equal
Protection Clauses of either the New York or United States Constitutions, which are similar in their breadth and wording.5
This Note examines the Court of Appeals’ decision in Walsh
v. Katz and its implications on the New York courts’ approach to
constitutionally suspect election laws. Part II analyzes the court’s
treatment of the appellant’s contentions, and argues that its failure to

1

953 N.E.2d 753 (N.Y. 2011).
Id. at 756. Fishers Island is a small, sparsely populated, and unconnected island within
the town of Southold.
3
Id. at 759.
4
Id. at 755. The main purpose of the residency requirement is to assure adequate representation in town government for the island’s residents. Id. The legislative rationale as laid
out in the “Laws of 1977” notes that because of the island’s “unique geographical position,”
the Fishers Island board member is intended to act as a link between the island and the town
government. Walsh, 953 N.E.2d at 755.
5
Id. at 758, 760.
2
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account for cautionary language in cited cases constituted an overly
deferential posture. Part III surveys the federal approach to residency
requirements, and election laws generally, which exhibits varying interpretations on how to approach the issue, in particular, disagreement over what Anderson v. Celebrezze6 and its progeny entail for the
treatment of challenged election laws. Part IV analyzes the court’s
modified approach to this issue as exhibited in Walsh and suggests a
variation of the approach that further incorporates the flexibility of
the Anderson analysis. Part IV.A tests the modified approach against
the facts of Walsh, examining its implications. It posits that an overly
deferential posture and the resultant oversight of factual considerations may have led the court to a different, and less meritorious, decision. Part V concludes by suggesting that in spite of the court’s legislatively deferential posture, its reliance on the Anderson analysis
allows for greater malleability in future challenges, which may be
successful if that test’s analytical flexibility is shrewdly employed.
II.

THE OPINION

Appellant Ross’s constitutional claims arose from his bid for
the dual town justice/town board member seat that was reserved for a
resident of Fishers Island, which he was not.7 The petitioners in the
suit brought an action to prohibit Ross from placing his name on the
ballot based on his lack of residency.8 Ross counterclaimed to have
his candidacy petition validated, and also challenged the constitutionality of the residency requirement.9
The Suffolk County Supreme Court dismissed the proceeding,
ruling that Ross had until thirty days after his election to obtain residency on Fishers Island.10 On appeal, the Appellate Division modified the lower court order to require that Ross obtain residency upon
taking the seat on the Town Board.11 Addressing Ross’s constitutional claims, the Appellate Division held that a rational basis stand6

Anderson, 460 U.S. 780. Addressing challenges to Ohio’s early filing requirement for
independent candidates, the Court in Anderson enunciated a novel “balancing analysis” that
it used it lieu of the traditional Equal Protection analysis. Anderson’s progeny exhibits disagreement over the proper application of the analysis.
7
Walsh, 953 N.E.2d at 756.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss4/28

2

Hodgkinson: Evaluating Candidacy Restrictions

2013]

EVALUATING CANDIDACY RESTRICTIONS

1557

ard was applicable and that the residency requirement was justified
by the existence of such a rational basis.12 Ross appealed from the
portions of the Appellate Division order that upheld the constitutionality of the residency requirement and the court’s use of a rational basis standard in deciding that issue.13 Although Ross eventually lost
the election, the court retained the issue as a declaratory judgment
proceeding.14
A.

Appellant’s Contentions: Standard of Review,
Constitutional Claims, and Application of the
Former to the Latter

Ross had three contentions, all of which were resolved against
him by the court. The first was the threshold issue of the appropriate
standard to apply in determining whether the residency requirement
was unconstitutional: rational basis or strict scrutiny.15 Ross argued
that a strict scrutiny standard was applicable because the statutory
provision affected fundamental interests, namely the right to vote and
the right to run for public office.16 In response, the court deemed the
latter interest non-fundamental.17 The second contention was the alleged constitutional violation, which was predicated upon two subclaims: first, that the residency requirement was violative of equal
protection guarantees because it reserved one seat on the town board
for a small segment of the larger population, thereby limiting the
population’s voting interests; and second, that the designation of one
seat to a resident of Fishers Island created a district within the town
and catered to the interests of a few residents over the whole, effectively diluting votes and offending State and Federal Equal Protection
Clauses.18 Finally, Ross argued that the legislative justifications for
the requirement were neither “compelling” nor supported by any “ra-

12

Walsh, 953 N.E.2d at 756.
Id.
14
Id. Additionally, Ross claimed that his right to vote was being unconstitutionally burdened by the residency requirement. Id.
15
Id. at 756-57.
16
Walsh, 953 N.E.2d at 757.
17
Id. at 758 n.2 (“Strict scrutiny has been held applicable to ballot access cases involving
restrictions based on wealth or restrictions that impose special burdens on new or small political parties or independent candidates.” (citing Golden v. Clark, 564 N.E.2d 611, 613 (N.Y.
1990))).
18
Id. at 757.
13
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tional bases.”19
B.

The Court’s Reasoning

The court relied almost entirely on United States Supreme
Court decisions throughout its opinion. Prior to beginning its analysis, the court illustrated the nearly identical wording of the federal
and New York Equal Protection clauses and stated that the New York
clause is as broad as the federal clause.20 Consequently, New York’s
analytical framework in approaching this issue is a synthesis of different federal approaches. Its implementation of that framework,
however, is its own.
The first issue that the court undertook was the determination
of the appropriate standard of review.21 It prefaced its analysis of this
issue by emphasizing the fundamental importance of the right to vote
under the Federal Constitution, but with the caveat that voting rights
and rights of political association were subject to limitations.22 Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Anderson,23 the court stated
that “whether the [voting regulation] governs the registration and
qualifications of voters, the selection and eligibility of candidates, or
the voting process itself, [the regulation] inevitably affects, at least to
some degree, the individual’s right to vote and his right to associate
with others for political ends.”24 Thus, subjecting every electoral
regulation to a standard of strict scrutiny could significantly impede a
state’s ability to run its elections efficiently because of the rigor that a

19

Id. The words “compelling” and “rational bases” are terms of art in the Constitutional
dynamic. The former accompanies a “strict scrutiny” standard of review, characterizing the
type of interest that the state must be seeking to regulate. The latter defines what is required
to support a “rational basis” standard of review, namely justifications that appear rationally
related to advancing the state interest.
20
Id.
21
Walsh, 953 N.E.2d at 756-57.
22
Id. at 757. Limitations on the right to vote are essential to the proper exercise of that
right. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 441 (1992) (“But the right to vote is the right to
participate in an electoral process that is necessarily structured to maintain the integrity of
the democratic system.”); Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433 (“Common sense, as well as constitutional law, compels the conclusion that government must play an active role in structuring
elections; ‘as a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are
to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.’ ” (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974))).
23
460 U.S. 780, 788.
24
Walsh, 953 N.E.2d at 757 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788).
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statute must undergo to satisfy that standard.25
Having recognized the legitimate interest that a state has in
regulating its electoral procedures, the court stressed the need for a
balance between this interest and the fundamental right to vote,
which is protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.26 As
such, the appropriate standard of review, when faced with a challenge
to a state election law, is predicated upon a consideration of the extent to which the law impinges upon First and Fourteenth Amendment protections and, if the injury appears more than minimal, finding a compelling state interest to justify that invasion.27 As the Court
of Appeals stated, “a court’s inquiry into the propriety of a state election law depends upon the extent to which a challenged regulation directly infringes upon First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.”28 In
applying this principle, the court relied on another Supreme Court
case, Bullock v. Carter,29 to delineate the mechanics of its application.30 The court reasoned that although provisions affecting the right
to run for office have an incidental effect on the right vote, such indirect and minimal effects do not by themselves compel a strict scrutiny standard of review.31 Supplementing this notion was the court’s
statement that the right to run for a public office is not fundamental.32
Having established a rational basis as the standard for its continued review, the court addressed Ross’s claim that the residency requirement impermissibly diluted votes by creating a district within an
“otherwise at-large town election system.”33 The court rejected this
argument by applying the reasoning that it used in addressing the issue of the appropriate standard of review, and also by drawing on

25

Id.
Id. at 758.
27
Id.
28
Id. The word “inquiry,” as used in this context, and standard of review are analogous.
29
Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972). Bullock concerned high filing fees for candidates seeking to run in the Texas primary elections. The Supreme Court held that the limiting effect of these fees on possible candidates resonated significantly enough with voters’
rights so as to justify a more stringent standard of review, ultimately invalidating the law as
violative of equal protection guarantees.
30
Walsh, 953 N.E.2d at 758; Bullock, 405 U.S. at 143 (“[L]aws that affect candidates always have at least some theoretical, correlative effect on voters. Of course, not every limitation or incidental burden on the exercise of voting rights is subject to a stringent standard of
review.”).
31
953 N.E.2d at 758.
32
Id. (citing Golden v. Clark, 564 N.E.2d 611 (N.Y. 1990)).
33
Id. at 757.
26
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analogies to two similar Supreme Court cases, Dusch v. Davis34 and
Dallas County v. Reese.35
Applying a rational basis standard of review, the court
weighed the injury to the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights
against the state justification for the law.36 It reasoned that because
all voters were able to vote for the Fishers Island seat and the regulation was based on a legitimate state interest, the law was neither discriminatory nor unreasonable.37 Further, the court addressed concerns that although the votes are not actually diluted, the residency
requirement may confer more influence to this smaller segment of the
population by giving the island its own representative.38 In resolving
this issue, the Court relied on two notions: the first was the fact that a
candidate running for the Fishers Island seat would not have to establish residency on the island until after that person had won the election, thereby leaving an opportunity for a non-Fishers Island resident
to run for the seat, although not hold it;39 the second was the idea that
“elected officials represent all of those who elect them, and not merely those who are their neighbors.”40 The court further supplemented
this reasoning by examining the two United States Supreme Court
cases mentioned previously, Dallas County and Dusch, which both
concerned Equal Protection Clause challenges to residency requirements.
C.

Dusch and Dallas County: Unheeded Warnings

Dusch concerned the apportionment of an eleven-member city
council in which four of its members were elected without regard to
their residency and the remaining seven were required to be residents
of each of the city’s seven boroughs.41 The populations of these boroughs ranged from less than 1,000 to almost 30,000.42 The petitioners contended that this apportionment plan amounted to an unequal

34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

387 U.S. 112 (1967).
421 U.S. 477 (1975).
Walsh, 953 N.E.2d at 758.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 759.
Id. (quoting Dallas County, 421 U.S. at 480).
Dusch, 387 U.S. 112.
Id.
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representation of the city’s voters.43 The Supreme Court, however,
disagreed, noting that the plan made “no distinction on the basis of
race, creed, or economic status or location. Each of the 11 councilmen [was] elected by a vote of all the electors in the city.”44 Further,
each vote held equal weight on all the candidates, which the Court
deemed as an incentive for the candidates to act in the interest of all
the voters, rather than only those in their districts.45
In Walsh, the Court of Appeals also relied on this notion, although it did not address the admonishments that followed the language in Dusch. Specifically, the Supreme Court stated that “the present consolidation plan uses boroughs in the city ‘merely as the basis
of residence for candidates, not for voting or representation;’ ”46 and
further, its caveat that “[i]f a borough’s resident on the council represented in fact only the borough, residence being only a front, different conclusions might follow.”47
In Dallas County, an equal protection challenge was brought
against a statutory provision that required each of the four members
of the county commission to reside in each of the four residency districts.48 The claim was predicated on the fact that although the four
districts had significantly disproportionate population densities, each
nevertheless had to have one of its residents serving on the commission.49 Upholding the validity of the residency requirement, the Supreme Court reasoned, as the Court of Appeals did in Walsh, that
when “an official’s ‘tenure depends upon the countywide electorate[,]
he must be vigilant to serve the interests of all the people in the county, and not merely those of people in his home district.’ ”50 However,
the Court in Dallas made a distinction between the districts being
used as merely a basis for the candidates’ residency and having them
function in a representative manner, hinting that the latter may be inappropriate.51
In Walsh, the Court of Appeals did not address this warning
43

Id. at 113.
Id. at 115.
45
Id.
46
Dusch, 387 U.S.at 115 (quoting, in part, Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 438 (1965))
(emphasis added).
47
Id. at 116.
48
Dallas County, 421 U.S. at 477.
49
Id. at 478.
50
Id. at 479-80 (quoting Fortson, 379 U.S. at 438).
51
Id. at 480.
44
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from Dallas, even though the Southold legislative notes on the residency requirement indicated that it was meant to give Fishers Island
residents special representation on the town board.52 The Court of
Appeals relied on the idea that because all voters may partake in the
Fishers Island election their votes were not diluted.53 However, it
seems that the importance of the “one vote, one person”54 concept
used by the court is in its assurance of equal representation, and having a special representative for a small segment of the population,
contradicts the principle underlying this concept.
The Court of Appeals’ failure to reconcile the cautionary language in Dusch and Dallas with the facts of Walsh, specifically the
residency requirement’s representational intent,55 exhibited an overly
deferential posture. Unequal representation was a glaring concern in
Dusch and Dallas, yet the Court of Appeals gave the issue minimal
treatment. Faced with a claim of unequal representation, the issue’s
resolution, at a minimum, demanded assessing the requirement’s
modern necessity, considering that the legislation was over thirty
years old and predicated on a lack of communication with the mainland. Moreover, as this Note will illustrate, the court had the tools to
undertake a more thorough analysis.56 In the aggregate, these factors
signal that greater explication was necessary. The court’s failure to
properly consider the foregoing factors likely resulted in an incorrect
decision.
III.

FEDERAL APPROACH

When assessing a constitutional challenge to a state election
law that limits ballot access, federal courts are primarily concerned
with the effects that such limitations may have on voters’ rights.57
Absent any substantial effect on voting rights, the court will undertake a less rigorous evaluation of the challenged law as it tries to balance state and individual interests.58 Further, while a candidate’s
52

Walsh, 953 N.E.2d at 755.
Id. at 759.
54
Id. at 758 (stating that Ross’s reliance on “one person, one vote” principle in apportionment cases is misplaced because those cases had the effect of diluting votes, resulting in unequal voting power).
55
Id. at 755.
56
See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
57
Anderson, 460 U.S. at 786.
58
Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974).
53
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right to run for office is not treated as fundamental,59 the Supreme
Court has held it to be as important as the state’s interest in regulating
its electoral process, stating that “[t]his legitimate state interest, however, must be achieved by a means that does not unfairly or unnecessarily burden either a minority party’s or an individual candidate’s
equally important interest in the continued availability of political
opportunity.”60 Thus, an election law limiting ballot access, notwithstanding any effect that it may have on voters’ rights, will not likely
pass constitutional muster if it appears arbitrary or “not reasonably
necessary to the accomplishment of the State’s legitimate election interests.”61 In instances where the electoral impediment was a residency requirement, with challenges often arising out of a requisite
durational period attached to the residency and alleged dilution of
votes, the courts’ analyses have been no different.62 Because of the
collateral effects that candidacy requirements invariably have on voting rights, courts have deemed the rigor of their inquiry to be predicated upon the extent to which a regulation encroaches on constitutional interests.63
Starting from this base, the Supreme Court in Bullock emphasized the importance of realistically considering candidacy restrictions in light of their impact on voters.64 Restrictions that impinge too far upon voters’ rights require a greater degree of scrutiny
and compelling state justifications.65 The Court’s decision in Bullock

59

Bullock, 405 U.S. at 142-43 (“[T]he Court has not heretofore attached such fundamental
status to candidacy as to invoke a rigorous standard of review.”).
60
Lubin, 415 U.S. at 716.
61
Id. at 718. See also Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 364 (1970) (finding no reasonable
state interest in the requirement that members of county board of education be freeholders).
Although a standard of review was not explicitly enunciated by the Court, it is likely applying an “intermediate” standard of review, which falls between the “rational basis” and “strict
scrutiny” standards. Such a standard has been applied where the state interest was “important,” the benefits of the means used were substantially related to the interest, and the
burden to be overcome was characterized as “not substantially more burdensome than necessary.” R. Randall Kelso, Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Clause and Related Constitutional Doctrines Protecting Individual Rights: The “Base Plus Six” Model and
Modern Supreme Court Practice, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 225, 258 (2002).
62
See generally, John D. Perovich, Validity of Requirement that Candidate or Public Officer Have Been Resident of Governmental Unit for Specified Period. 65 A.L.R.3d 1048
(originally published in 1975) (considering a broad array of federal and state cases where
durational residency requirements have been challenged).
63
Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434.
64
Bullock, 405 U.S. at 143.
65
Id. at 144.
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illustrates the Equal Protection Clause analysis. The analysis begins
with the threshold issue of whether a rational basis or a strict scrutiny
standard is applicable; the former only requires a rational justification
for the law, while the latter requires a compelling state interest for
it.66 The differing level of scrutiny between the two standards is substantial, with courts inclined to defer to a state’s regulatory interest
under the rational basis test67 as opposed to the more exacting review
that accompanies a strict scrutiny standard.68
Considering the Equal Protection Clause analyses of cases
such as Bullock, the Court in Anderson delineated a balancing approach which it used in lieu of the equal protection analysis.69 Eschewing the notion that a constitutional challenge to a state election
law could be resolved in a formulaic manner, the Court laid out its
analytical blueprint:
A court must resolve such a challenge by an analytical
process that parallels its work in ordinary litigation. It
must first consider the character and magnitude of the
asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to
vindicate. It then must identify and evaluate the pre66
Id. at 142. See also Natl. Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 438 (1963) (“The decisions of this Court have consistently held that only a compelling
state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State’s constitutional power to regulate
can justify limiting First Amendment freedoms.”); Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (“The rigorousness of our inquiry into the propriety of a state election law depends upon the extent to
which a challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights . . . when
those rights are subjected to ‘severe’ restrictions, the regulation must be ‘narrowly drawn to
advance a state interest of compelling importance.’ ” (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S.
279, 289 (1992))).
67
Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788 (“Nevertheless, the state’s important regulatory interests are
generally sufficient to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions.”).
68
See Bullock, 405 U.S. at 147 (“In addition to the State’s purported interest in regulating
the ballot, the filing fees serve to relieve the State treasury of the cost of conducting the primary elections, and this is a legitimate state objective; in this limited sense it cannot be said
that the fee system lacks a rational basis. But under the standard of review [strict scrutiny]
we consider applicable to this case, there must be a showing of necessity.”) (emphasis added).
69
Anderson, 460 U.S. at 786 n.7 (“In this case, we base our conclusions directly on the
First and Fourteenth Amendments and do not engage in a separate Equal Protection Clause
analysis. We rely, however, on the analysis in a number of our prior election cases resting
on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). In addition to Bullock, the
Court in Anderson also specifically mentioned Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968),
Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974), and Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979), as cases that it relied on in fashioning its alternative analysis.
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cise interests put forward by the State as justifications
for the burden imposed by its rule. In passing judgment, the Court must not only determine the legitimacy and strength of each of those interests; it also must
consider the extent to which those interests make it
necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights. Only after
weighing all these factors is the reviewing court in a
position to decide whether the challenged provision is
unconstitutional.70
The constitutional challenge facing the Court in Anderson
stemmed from an early filing requirement for independent candidates
running for United States President.71 Weighing the voter onus
against the state interests served, and considering the importance of a
presidential election, the Court held in a 5-4 decision that the Ohio
statute’s exclusionary effect on independent voters outweighed the
interests proffered by the state.72 In contrast, the dissent focused on
the rational nature of the laws and their allowance of reasonable access for independent candidates, urging restraint from interference
with Article II grants.73
The split in the Court’s decision could be seen as a byproduct
of the alternative, more equivocal, analysis that it applied. Whereas
an Equal Protection Clause analysis is more structured and demands a
certain standard of review, the balancing analysis used by the Court
in Anderson allows for more discretion regarding the depth of review
applied to the suspect law, and lacks the guidance afforded by an
analysis that is led by a prearranged standard.74 Indeed, as the scion
of this seminal case make clear, Anderson’s balancing analysis has
proven especially conducive to varying interpretations. New York’s
novel application of the analysis in Walsh follows this trend.

70

Id. at 789.
Id. at 782.
72
Id. at 806.
73
Id. at 806-07 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
74
See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 205 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring) (calling the Anderson test an “amorphous ‘flexible standard’ ” (quoting Burdick,
504 U.S. at 428)). See also Dmitri Evseev, A Second Look at Third Parties: Correcting the
Supreme Court’s Understanding of Elections, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1277, 1328 (2005) (claiming
that the Anderson analysis is more flexible and expressly provides judges with the tools to
undertake a more thorough analysis).
71
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NEW YORK’S MODIFIED APPROACH

The Court of Appeals’ approach in Walsh signals a departure
from its previous, and arguably less ambiguous, mode of analysis,
which was based predominantly on the federal Equal Protection
Clause analysis. While previous New York cases concerning election
laws continued to apply an equal protection analysis in spite of the
evolving federal jurisprudence, the court in Walsh, so to speak, “updated” its analysis.75 In Walsh, the Court of Appeals adopted the
Equal Protection Clause analysis utilized by the United States Supreme Court in cases such as Bullock, but relied on the balancing test
from Anderson in order to establish the appropriate standard of review.76 However, because of the ambiguity that accompanies the
Anderson analysis,77 this altered analytical framework added a layer
of opacity to the New York approach.
Although this analysis will require further application to effectively flesh out its nuances, the court in Walsh gave some indication of what its interpretation of Anderson entails. Specifically, the
court’s use of the language “In sum, a court’s inquiry into the propriety of a state election law depends upon the extent to which a challenged regulation directly infringes upon First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights,”78 is nearly verbatim to the Supreme Court’s language in Burdick,79 a decision that Justice Scalia interpreted as clarifying the Anderson test.80 Additionally, the New York court’s application of its analysis is very similar to Justice Scalia’s interpretation
of the Burdick decision expounded upon in his concurring decision in

75

See Golden, at 623 (applying equal protection analysis, and forgoing Anderson analysis,
to city charter prohibiting high city officers from holding political office as a requisite for
their holding public office; decided seven years after Anderson decision).
76
Walsh, 953 N.E.2d at 754.
77
See generally Burdick, 504 U.S. 428 (disagreeing over what Anderson test entails);
Crawford, 553 U.S. 181 (illustrating disagreement among concurring and dissenting opinions regarding how Anderson test should be objectified).
78
Walsh, 953 N.E.2d at 758.
79
See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (“Under this standard [Anderson analysis], the rigorousness of our inquiry into the propriety of a state election law depends upon the extent to
which a challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.”).
80
See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 205 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Burdick forged Anderson’s
amorphous ‘flexible standard’ into something resembling an administrable rule.”). But see
Crawford, 553 U.S. at 190 n.8 (reaffirming the original Anderson balancing test and stating
that “[c]ontrary to Justice S[calia]’s suggestion . . . our approach remains faithful to Anderson and Burdick.”).
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Crawford.81 Thus, Justice Scalia’s concurrence would seem to offer
a more lucid understanding of what the New York approach to this
issue may entail. However, when considering the guidance that Justice Scalia attached to assessing the burden,82 as well as the admonishments from Dusch and Dallas County,83 it is evident that the New
York court, while ostensibly relying to an extent on federal rationale,
was reluctant to carry that rationale as far as its language permitted.
Indeed, the New York court’s injection of the Anderson analysis carried with it the flexible ambiguities, and analytical opportunities, endemic to the textual makeup of that test. As one scholar aptly stated,
“The Anderson test already contains . . . most of the inquiries necessary for such a thorough and detailed analysis. . . . [T]he tools for a
more rigorous analysis of ballot-access restrictions are clearly available; the question is only whether courts will choose to make use of
them.”84 The court’s scant examination of the rationale behind the
residency requirement exhibited a reluctance to fully engage in Anderson’s thorough analysis. Considering that the test’s analytical
flexibility affords a more thorough treatment, the Court of Appeals’
failure to employ that rigor displayed a firm deferential posture.
Thus, the Court of Appeals’ approach to this issue modifies
the federal analysis in a manner that yields a more lenient application.
It gives minimal consideration to the federal notion that certain traits
of an election law may stretch a rational basis standard to its limits,
triggering greater review than that standard traditionally entails, or
even tipping the standard at its threshold to one of “strict scrutiny.”85
81

Compare Walsh, 953 N.E.2d at 758 (utilizing Anderson analysis to establish the appropriate level of rigor to be used in the inquiry), with Crawford, 553 U.S. at 205 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“Since Burdick, we have repeatedly reaffirmed the primacy of its two-track approach. . . . [T]he first step is to decide whether a challenged law severely burdens the right
to vote.”) (citations omitted).
82
Crawford, 553 U.S. at 205 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Burdens are severe if they go beyond the merely inconvenient.”); Id. at 206 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that the burden
stemming from the regulation should be measured by its “likely impact”) (quoting Storer v.
Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 738 (1974)). In the case of Walsh, the “likely impact” of the regulation, practically considered, is the strong dissuasion of non-Fishers Island residents from
running for that seat. The heavy burden of taking up residency on the island translates into a
significant reduction of potential candidates, which significantly burdens voting rights.
83
See supra Part II.C.
84
Dmitri Evseev, A Second Look at Third Parties: Correcting the Supreme Court’s Understanding of Elections, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1277, 1328 (2005) (emphasis added).
85
See Dallas County, 421 U.S. at 480 (warning that indications of unequal representation
may compel different results). See also Bullock, 405 U.S. at 143 (“In approaching candidate
restrictions, it is essential to examine in a realistic light the extent and nature of their impact
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This cautionary ethos is further supplemented by the Supreme
Court’s language in Crawford, which, applying the Anderson balancing analysis, cautioned that “[h]owever slight that burden [resulting
from a state election law] may appear[,] . . . it must be justified by
relevant and legitimate state interests ‘sufficiently weighty to justify
the limitation.’ ”86 In contrast to this fluid analysis, the Court of Appeals’ treatment of Anderson indicated an inevitably dichotomous
outcome, resulting in either “strict scrutiny” or “rational basis” review, and an inclination to accept the legislative justification if it
evinced a colorable rationale.87 This narrow usage of Anderson’s
language to establish a standard of review,88 coupled with the failure
to address the federal warnings attached to the decision,89 resulted in
an approach that exhibits an overly deferential posture towards legislative action and accepts legislative rationale at face value. Alleviating the rigidness inherent in pre-conceived standards is the main utility of the Anderson analysis, which seeks to achieve an adequate
balance between voting rights and the regulatory interests that are
necessary to maintain those rights.90 While the New York court’s
“two-track”91 analytical framework helped elucidate a very abstract
subject, its attendant rationale failed to redress the factual merits.92
on voters.”).
86
Bullock, 405 U.S. at 191 (quoting Norman, 502 U.S. at 288-89).
87
Walsh, 953 N.E.2d at 759-60.
88
Id. at 758.
89
See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 786 (“Our primary concern is with the tendency of ballot access restrictions ‘to limit the field of candidates from which voters might choose.’ Therefore, ‘[i]n approaching candidate restrictions, it is essential to examine in a realistic light the
extent and nature of their impact on voters.’ ”) (citing Bullock, 405 U.S. at 143).
90
See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 210 (Souter, J., dissenting) (recognizing the legitimacy of
regulatory and voting interests, particularly in how the former supports the latter, and acknowledging the court’s preference of a balancing analysis over a pre-set level of scrutiny in
order to better accommodate the two interests).
91
Id. at 205 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that Burdick forged Anderson’s analysis into
an administrable rule and created a “two-track” approach, the first step is assessing the burden, and the second is applying the appropriate level of scrutiny, with severe burdens receiving “strict scrutiny”).
92
As previously mentioned, Justice Scalia’s “two-track” interpretation of Burdick is similar to the Court of Appeals’ analysis, which also uses a two-step approach. Analytically,
both initially seek to divide the analysis into one of two diametric standards of review. The
difference between the two analyses is in how the burden is assessed, with Justice Scalia
stressing the burden should be measured by its “likely impact,” and the Court of Appeals
seemingly relying more upon the legislative regulatory interest. Regardless, however, both
are flawed in their interpretation of Anderson’s analysis, which remains a flexible analysis
and not one that requires rigid standards of review; that standard is “rational basis” or “deferential important regulatory interests.” See id. at 190 n.8 (“Contrary to Justice Scalia’s sug-
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Rather, the Court of Appeals should retain this framework, but with a
rationale more in line with Anderson and its progeny.93 Its restraint
was inconsistent with the language that it relied upon to determine
the scope of its review.94 Merit would have been better served had
the court carried out its analysis in a more liberal manner, which
would have been consistent with the language it used in fashioning its
approach.95
A.

The Implications of the Modified Approach

The facts of Walsh seem to trigger the warning signs that the
various Supreme Court decisions attached to the analyses adopted by
the Court of Appeals. However, because of the court’s restrained
level of review, the circumstances of the Walsh residency requirement that would likely raise flags under a federal approach do not receive much attention under the New York court’s analysis. For example, the residency requirement appears to be a significant deterrent
for any non-Fishers Island resident, as it entails the burden of relocating if elected to that seat on the town board;96 in limiting their candidates, this deterrent has more than a minimal impact on the voters’
rights. The rationale behind this aspect of the law would certainly
warrant a deeper review under federal interpretations of the Anderson
gestion our approach remains faithful to Anderson and Burdick. . . . To be sure, Burdick rejected the argument that strict scrutiny applies to all laws imposing a burden on the right to
vote; but in its place, the Court applied the ‘flexible standard’ set forth in Anderson. Burdick
surely did not create a novel ‘deferential important regulatory interests’ standard.’ ”) (citations omitted).
93
See generally Anderson, 460 U.S. at 786 (“Our primary concern is with the tendency of
ballot access restrictions ‘to limit the field of candidates from which voters might choose.’
Therefore, ‘[i]n approaching candidate restrictions, it is essential to examine in a realistic
light the extent and nature of their impact on voters.’ ”) (citing Bullock, 405 U.S. at 143);
Norman, 502 U.S. at 288-89 (holding there must be a corresponding state interest that is
“sufficiently weighty” to justify limiting a party’s access to the ballot); Burdick, 504 U.S. at
434 (holding that a court must evaluate “the extent to which those [state regulatory] interests
make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights.”); Crawford, 553 U.S. at 190 (Rather than
applying any ‘litmus test’ that would neatly separate valid from invalid restrictions . . . a
court must identify and evaluate the interests put forward by the State as justifications for the
burden imposed by its rule . . . and make the ‘hard judgment’ that our adversary system demands).
94
Crawford, 553 U.S. at 190 (“Rather than applying any ‘litmus test’ that would neatly
separate valid from invalid restrictions . . . a court must identify and evaluate the interests
put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule, and then make
the ‘hard judgment’ that our adversary system demands.”) (emphasis added).
95
See supra note 81; discussion infra part IV.A.
96
Walsh, 953 N.E.2d at 758-59.
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analysis.97 However, New York appears content with merely examining the veneer of legislative rationale, a disposition that seems at
odds with the more flexible analysis it put in place. Furthermore, in
Walsh, the justification for the residency requirement was based on a
lack of connection between the Fishers Island residents and the mainland.98 However, since the time of the residency requirement’s reenactment in 1977,99 there has been a substantial advance in communications technology, thus indicating that the reasons for the requirement may be anachronistic. Notwithstanding this indication, the
Court of Appeals failed to give any consideration to the modern necessity of the residency requirement. Walsh displayed a firm aversion to submitting ballot access laws, and, presumably, the broader
class of election laws subject to this modified approach, to thorough
analytical review. Such an inclination, as Walsh demonstrates, may
result in the omission of key factual inquiries.
V.

CONCLUSION

Because it is not entirely clear how much consideration the
Court of Appeals gave to federal indications of what may drive a
candidacy restriction into the realm of unconstitutionality, the success
of future challenges to election laws and candidacy restrictions did
not gain much certainty in New York. However, this absence of consideration combined with the Court’s adoption of different federal
approaches, and also its heavy reliance on federal case law, leaves
room for significant malleability in future challenges, which may be
successful if these warnings are prominently placed in their makeup.
Furthermore, the ambiguity inherent in the language of the Anderson
test, as well as the general uncertainty surrounding what exactly it entails,100 leaves ample room for creative reasoning. The apparent per97
See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 190 (interpreting Anderson as requiring state justifications
that are “sufficiently weighty” to justify candidate ballot access restrictions) (quoting Norman, 502 U.S. at 289)); Id. at 206 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he severity of the burden of a
regulation should be measured according to its ‘nature, extent, and likely impact.’ ”) (quoting
Storer, 415 U.S. at 738)); Id. at 210-11 (Souter, J., dissenting) (characterizing Anderson
analysis as a “sliding-scale balancing analysis” that demands “hard facts”).
98
Walsh, 953 N.E.2d at 755.
99
Id. at 756.
100
See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 208 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The lead opinion’s recordbased resolution of these cases, which neither rejects nor embraces the rule of our precedents, provides no certainty, and will embolden litigants who surmise that our precedents
have been abandoned.”); See also Bryan P. Jensen, Crawford v. Marion County Election
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functory consideration of federal caveats by the Court of Appeals
does not foreclose their use in future New York cases of this variety.
Rather, it is prudent to recognize that the nascent Walsh analysis has
yet to be refined by the Court of Appeals, and is borne out of conflicting jurisprudence on the federal level. Consequently, the Court
of Appeals’ initial treatment of the matter may be a product of the
federal tumult still attached to the Anderson analysis, a response to an
ineffectively argued challenge, or an inclination to withhold more
thorough analysis. Equivocation clouds this analysis in its infancy.
Only repeated exhibition will bear a more lucid account of what this
analysis will entail for future New York cases.
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